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BAKER v. CARR AND MINORITY
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
JOSEPH M. CORMACK*

1. Minority Rule Through Unequal Voting Districts Abolished.
Baker v. CarrI effects a fundamental change in our state and
federal governmental systems. It will bring genuine democracy
to the states in place of rural oligarchy, and will change the
relation of the states to the federal government. The urban
majority of the people of the states will be able to get greater
sympathy, justice and effective help from their legislatures, and
will feel less necessity to turn to the Washington government
for the solution of their problems.
This historic case, decided by the United States Supreme
Court March 26, 1962, holds that under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment a citizen of a state is
entitled to vote, not just by dropping a piece of paper in a box,
but by having his vote given reasonably equal weight with that
of other citizens. The "political questions" doctrine,2 that
such matters can not be passed upon judicially, is as dead as the
concept of "matrimonial domicil"3 in divorce law, 4 and its
demise here should be equally unlamented.
The principles of the decision mean, specifically, that
districts for the election of members of state legislatures and
Congress are required to be reasonably equal in size as to population, and that divergencies in population will have to be upon
a legally justifiable basis, not simply a desire to have the state
governed by a minority of rural voters rather than by a ma* LL.B., J.S.D., Professor of Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law,

College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia.
1 82 Sup. Ct. 691 (1962).
2 See, e.g. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
3 Based on Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
4

Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
(1945).

(1942)

and 325 U.S. 226
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jority of the voters as a whole. While the use of criteria other
than population is not prohibited, it may be confidently predicted that the permitted total force of factors other than population will be relatively minor.
How the requirement of reasonably equal districts is to be
carried out, and how far districts will be permitted to vary, are
not passed upon (the case is simply remanded to the district
court). These, however, are simply matters of mechanics, and
should create no difficulty. Particularly is this true when a
simple remedy is available-weightedvoting. A court should
order that until such time as a reasonable system of apportionment is established each member of the offending body
(Congressional districts being handled upon a state-by-state
basis) shall cast a vote weighted in accordance with the number
of those represented by him, preferably the number voting at
the last general election. The member representing the
smallest number will cast one vote, each of the others a vote
proportionately higher, (carried out to two decimal points). In
this scientific age it is a simple matter to have an electrical
machine tabulate the totals almost instantaneously.
Such a system will give perfect democratic government in
this respect, and it is to be hoped that once such a system has
been established no state (or the federal government) will
desire to depart from it. The rural and isolated areas can then
be given all the spokesmen they need (the loss of spokesmen
having been used as an argument against reapportionment by
population), without turning the state into a rural oligarchy.
Setting up such a system will be simple for both the court and
the legislature (or Congress), and will be relatively painless for
the members already elected, in that no member will lose his
seat. This possiblility has been at least a subconscious factor
preventing redistricting.
A great principle is involved. It seems unnecessary to do
more than state that we believe in democracy, that democratic government consists of rule by the majority of the
people, and that in order to completely have such rule voters
must be given votes of reasonably equal value. Any departure
from equality is that much of a loss from the standpoint of
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achieving perfect democratic representation. The device of
weighted voting would make any departure unnecessary.
The nature, extent and seriousness of the problem of
unequal districts are matters of common knowledge, discussed
in innumerable newspaper and magazine articles. It seems unnecessary to present statistics here. They are to be found in the
opinions in the case.
Mr. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the court, joined
by five others, Mr. Justice Whittaker, presumably because of
illness, not participating in the decision. Three other members
of the majority, Mr. Justices Douglas, Clark and Stewart,
wrote concurring opinions. The other members of the majority were Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Black.
Justices Black and Douglas have long been in favor of judicial
action against unequal apportionment. Justice Clark in his
concurring opinion5 joins them in this emphatically.
Justice Brennan, in a painstaking opinion, speaking for the
majority, discusses separately that the subject matter of the suit
is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, r that the parties
plaintiff have standing to sue, 7 and, finally, that "this challenge
to an apportionment presents no nonjusticiable 'political
question' ".8 Technically the decision is limited to holding
that "the complaint's allegations of a denial of equal protection
present a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which
appellants are entitled to a trial and a decision". 9 However, as
it is necessary, in order to state a cause of action, that facts be
alleged which if established will cause relief to be granted, this
is a decision on the merits in favor of the principle of equal
protection.
Justice Brennan takes great pains to limit the decision to
rights under the equal protection clause, and to reject any pos5Baker v. Cart, 82 Sup. Ct. 691, 733 (1962).
61d. at 700.
7Id. at 703.

8id. at 705.
9Id. at 720.
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sible claims under the guaranty of a republican form of government in Article 4, Section 4, of the Constitution. 1o He feels
that such claims by their nature involve nonjusticiable political
questions. 1" While it does not seem to make any practical difference upon which constitutional provision the result is based,
it is difficult to agree with him in this. Since a republican form
of government requires general representation of the people,
rather than the government of professors suggested by Plato,
any distinction between the two constitutional provisions
would seem to be a distinction without a difference. This is
indicated by Justice Douglas. 12 By his line of reasoning Justice Brennan is able to avoid overruling Colegrove v. Green,13
the leading "political question" case, but it might have been
better frankly to do so, regardless of differences in the pleadings
in the two cases. At any rate that seems to be its practical position.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for himself and for Mr.
Justice Harlan, dissented. He feels that the case "is, in effect, a
Guaranty Clause claim masquerading under a different label", 14
and it is difficult to contradict him on this. He advances the
time-honored "political question" reasoning. He is appalled
by the difficulties of framing relief,' .5and the possibilities of
"friction and tension in federal-state relations". . 6
Justice Harlan added a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Frankfurter joined. He feels that the problem of apportionment
is by its nature wholly legislative, and he even takes the extreme
position that it would be constitutional for a state to maintain
"an electoral imbalance between its rural and urban population
... to protect the state's agricultural interests from the sheer
weight of numbers of those residing in its cities". 1 Such a
10 Id. at 706 and 715.
11ld. at 710.
12

Id. at 723.

13 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
'4 Baker v. Carr, 82 Sup. Ct. 691, 754 (1962).
15 Id. at 767.
1l d. at 768.
17 Id. at 774.
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position may be characterized as endorsement of a permanent
legally irremediable rural oligarchy. He concludes with the
observation that "continuing national respect for the Court's
authority depends in large measure upon its wise exercise of
self-restraint and discipline in constitutional adjudication". 18
In conclusion, this great decision will in all probability result in the removal of a great obstacle to the achievement of
effective democratic government. This obstacle would not
otherwise be susceptible to removal by legal means, in view of
the general refusal of state legislatures and executives to reapportion and in general what has been the failure of the courts
to compel them to do so.
This is a fitting time to examine our governmental processes
in general, and see what obstacles to the achievement of truly
democratic government will still persist. In the course of our
future history all of these should eventually be removed.
2.

Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances-Minority
Rule Through Preventing Action.

When a majority of the people for any reason is unable to
take action which it desires, the minority opposed to change
are governing' 9. Thus minority rule is more often negative
than positive, election of the members of legislative bodies
through unequal districts being an example of the latter.
Either way, democratic government is not achieved.
Throughout the history of this country the overwhelming
majority of Americans have believed in democratic government, that is, majority rule. Its merits will be assumed, and
not argued here.
In our governmental systems, federal and state, checks and
balances, designed to prevent hasty action, are a primary
source of minority government. The traditional American
separation of powers between the executive, legislative and
18 Id. at 776.

19 For a more comprehensive discussion see ELLIOTT, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND MAJORITY RULE (1916).
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judicial branches is the most important factor in establishing
checks and balances.
The objection to separation of powers, from the present
standpoint, relates to that between the executive and the
legislative. The judicial branch should be independent, and
it never prevents the majority from taking action, except in
the sense that compliance with the forms of procedure -which
have been set up is required. The exception includes the
courts' application of constitutional limitations, which can be
removed through amendment.
Separation of powers arose out of the fear of kings, who
those establishing this country had good reason to fear would
arise here. The ideas of Aristotle and later thinkers, and unhappy experiences with colonial governors and legislatures,
were contributing factors. It was therefore natural that the
founders of our country should provide for separation of
powers. One would feel that it was inevitable, but for the
fact that four times during their deliberations they voted to
have the President elected by the Congress, eventually reversing
themselves. The states, with less reason, followed the example
of separation set before them by the federal government.
Our problems now are different, and obstacles to action by
government are simply shackles upon ourselves. Another
factor enters in to increase the importance of this, in that life
and government then were infinitely more simple, and the
times were correspondingly slow-moving. Dangers from
delay did not occur to our forefathers.
The separation is not complete, there are, for example,
powers of veto and impeachment, and the supplying of money
to the executive by the legislative, but these limitations do not
change the basic situation.
Today checks and balances have developed into a danger
which should be removed. Caution is a fine quality, but is
overdone when it invites paralysis. Now the executive head
of a government should be elected by and responsible to the
legislative branch. It is true that in general there have been no
catastrophic results from the separation of powers in our
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national government, although it is arguable that if President
Wilson and Congress had cooperated after World War I the
League of Nations would not have failed and Germany would
not have been able to bring on World War II. In any event, it is
undeniable that governmental paralysis through checks and
balances has appalling possibilities, and they should not be
permitted to develop into actualities.
Alexander Hamilton, this country's greatest constitutional
writer, foresaw the danger from checks and balances:
In those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or
badness, the weakness or strength of its government, is of
greatest importance, there is commonly a necessity for
action. If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion
of a majority respecting the best mode of conducting it,
the majority, in order that something may be done, must
conform to the views of the minority ... (emphasis added)20.
William B. Munro has observed:
The idea that there can be no liberty without checks and
balances is one that naturally found favor in an age when
Newton's mechanistic philosophy held sway over the minds
of men; but in this twentieth century, with our new outlook upon the universe around us, it is far from commanding
general acceptance. Checks and balances keep a government safe; but they also impede its endeavors to move
forward. They serve the cause of order but not of progress
There are many thoughtful Americans who now
believe that the theory of checks and balances is a delusion
and a snare, that it has made for confusion in the actual
work of government, that it divides responsibility, encourages friction, and has balked constructive legislation
on numberless occasions.21
Arthur C. Millspaugh has pointed out:
Our governmental organization produces an excess of
compromise. It makes bargaining a primary procedure and
20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 106 (Beloff ed. 1948) (Hamilton).
21 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 77 (3rd ed. 1933).
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a political habit. The causes, it would seem, lie in the
separation of authorities and in their check on one another,
in our too numerous assemblies, and in the sectional and
localistic basis of representation. In many cases too it is
the minority, rather than the majority, that actually rules
(Emphasis added) 2.
Cities have shown the way, with a city manager selected by
and responsible to the council or commission, no other officials
being elected. And what would we think of a private corporation endeavoring to operate under a system of checks and
balances? Every corporation is an economic nation, some far
from small ones, and its principles of efficiency should be
applied to governments.
In some states checks and balances are multiplied, through
having several state officials elected.
A legislative body with a Senate and a lower house is an
important form of checks and balances. Adding the President
or Governor, there is a three-way system set up. There are
always great possibilities of non-cooperation and obstruction
so that nothing can be accomplished. Here again cities and
private corporations have set a good example, being governed
by a single body, and the nation and the states should achieve
their efficiency. One state, Nebraska, has already done so,
and reports indicate that the single chamber has worked well.
If the United States Senate were to be abolished, it is logical
to expect that the constitutional provision for two Senators to
each state would fall of its own weight and not be an obstacle,
upon the ground that there was nothing left to which it could
apply.
If any state will establish a legislature of a single body, called
the Senate, and have fifteen Senators each paid $15,000, and
giving all his time to his duties (or, better still, a twenty-five
twenty-five system), it will develop the greatest statesmen of
any state, and have the best set of laws.
22 TOWAD

EFFICIENT DEMOCRACY 232 (1949).
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3. Constitutions Difficult to Amend-Minority Rule Through
the Dead Hand of the Past.
A constitutional provision which the majority of the
people no longer believe in, but which they can not change
through amendment, constitutes minority rule through the
dead hand of the past. What was the will of the majority, as
expressed in the provision, has become the will of the minority.
The stringent requirements for amendment of the United
States Constitution23 (many of the states require only a
majority of the voters) were placed there as a compromise
after terrific struggle and as a result of fear of the new government. The limitations on amendment were necessary to
get the new government going, but now they amount to a
self-imposed partial paralysis which the country should outgrow. A people should not declare themselves incompetent
to handle their affairs. Thomas Jefferson, with this sort of
thing in mind, exclaimed, "The earth belongs to the living,
not to the dead".24 He said, further:
"We may consider each generation as a distinct nation,
with a right, by the will of its majority, to bind themselves,
but none to bind the succeeding generation, more than
the inhabitants of another country."2
Carrying his idea forward, Jefferson in the same passage
rather whimsically made use of life expectancy tables, and
figured out that at the expiration of eighteen years and eight
months from the establishment of a constitution, over one
half of the adults living at the time of the enactment will have
died. Therefore, he reasoned, a constitution should contain
a provision for its revision every nineteen years. In another
famous passage he said:
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and con23

U. S. CONST. art. V: Submission by a two-thirds vote in both the Senate
and the House of Representatives, with ratification by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the states (there is a never-used provision that twothirds of the states could require the calling of a national constitutional
convention to propose amendments).

24

Letter to J. W. Eppes, 1813.

25 Ibid.
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stitutions. But laws and institutions must go hand in hand
with progress of the human mind. As that becomes more
developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made,
new truths discovered and manners and opinions change,
with the change of circumstances, institutions must
advance also to keep pace with the times. We might as
well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him
when a boy as civilized society to remain ever under the
regimen of their barbarous ancestors. 2 6
Alexander Hamilton said:
When the concurrence of a large number is required by the
constitution to the doing of any national act, we are apt
to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper
will be likely to be done; but we forget how much good may
be prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the
power of hindering that which it is necessary to do, and
of keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which
they may happen to stand at particular periods. 27
Robert M. Mclver presented the matter thus:
• . . Where the constitution itself makes amendment
difficult, by requiring, say, a two-thirds or three-fourths
majority vote as a condition, a peculiar problem is raised.
It may be argued that what the constitution does is to
insure that public opinion is very definitely in favour of
any proposed change before it can be translated into law.
But it does more than this. It gives a veto power against
change to a minority. If then all government rests on the
will of the people, on what will does a system rest which
confers on the minority a right to veto the will of the
majority? It may be that the majority will acquiesce in, or
even approve of, a limitation of this kind, but how can we
be sure when by a past act it is deprived of present power?
Does not a constitution of so rigorous a character bind
the living will of the present? If we say with Austin that
the sovereign in the United States is a three-fourths
majority of the states, are we not really saying that a one26 Letter to Thomas Kercheval, 1816.
27

THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Beloff ed. 1948) (Hamilton).
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fourth minority is supreme? Have we not here an example
of what happens wherever men try to assure a more-thanmajority will? The endeavor ends in their enthroning a
minority will.. ." (Emphasis added) 28
A government should have a written constitution, but its
purpose, apart from providing for the structure of the government, should be limited to enshrining and preserving the
basic principles which the people believe in, protecting them
against violation and against change except by the vote of the
people themselves. The constitution should not be permitted
to become an instrument for defeating the will of the majority.
There is always danger to the stability of a government
when there is no legal way to give effect to the desires of the
majority of the people. If the matter is serious enough, there
will be revolution. Much more serious examples could be
imagined, but how would the American people feel if the
Twenty-first Amendment, repealing the prohibition Eighteenth,
had been ratified by the thirty-five most populous states, but
never by another? At the very least there would have been
widespread disrespect for law and disobedience of law, far
beyond anything experienced during the period of prohibition.
Undue delay presents the same danger, in lesser degree.
In the nature of things, under a system of law and order, a
considerable amount of time will be consumed in effecting a
change in the constitution of a nation (or of a state). This
period will insure against hasty or ill-considered action,
eliminating that objection to removing the extreme requirements which we now have. As Charles F. Emrick put it: "The
constitution as it stands makes for obstructive delay in the
of society
righting of grievances, and pens up the ferment
'
until it sometimes threatens the social order." 29
There is an old saying in the law, based upon observation
of unforeseen eventualities, that "the dead hand is a clumsy
hand". Let us remove it from control over our national life!
28 TBE MODERN STATE 376 (1926).

(1914), reprinted in ORTH, READINGS ON THE RELATIONS OF GOVERNMENT TO PROPERTY
AND INDUSTRY 82 (1915).

29 THE COURTS AND PROPERTY
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As to what should be required for national constitutional
change, I would suggest that an amendment be proposed by a
one-fifth vote of either the Senate or the House, or by ten
Legislatures, with ratification by a majority of the voters in a
national referendum. All other constitutional provisions for
votes by Congress should be placed upon a majority basis.
4. Two votes to each State in the Senate-Minority Rule
Preserved.
The Constitution provides that each state shall have two
United States Senators,30 an aggravated form of unequal
districts. This provision constitutes an exception to the statement earlier made that Baker v. Carr abolished minority rule
through unequal voting districts. This provision is protected
in the Constitution in a special way by the stipulation that
"no state shall, without its consent, be deprived of its
equal
representation in the Senate.' 31 Even this latter provision
should not lead us helplessly to conclude that such a denial of
democratic government must continue forever. The provision
for two Senators may well be interpreted to apply only to the
original thirteen states, as the others (with the exception of
Texas) did not surrender any pre-existing sovereignty when
admitted to the union; and the people of the thirteen states
should be fair-minded enough not to wish to continue their
unfair advantage throughout all future history. The rural
voters of Oregon showed in a referendum that they did not
desire an unfair advantage in state voting districts. 3 2 The
disparity between the populations of the states becomes greater
continuously, and this process is certain to continue.
The effect of the equal number of votes in the Senate is
magnified by the constitutional provision that in the Electoral
College each state shall have a number of Electors equal to the
number of Senators and Representatives to which it is entitled 33
and by all the special provisions for action by the Senate.
Further, the Twelfth Amendment provides that in case no
30 U. S. CONST., art. 1, § 3.

U. S. CONST., art. V.
32NEUBERGER, ADVENTURES IN POLITICS 118, 123, 127, 129 (1954).
31

33 U. S. CONST., art II, § 1.
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candidate for President receives a majority of the votes in the
Electoral College each state shall cast one vote in the House of
Representatives. In time the Electoral College should give
way to direct election of the President by the voters, and there
should be national primaries. Selection of the President by
Congress would of course eliminate the Electoral College.
Originally the provision for two Senators for each state
was unavoidable, to get the new nation formed, just as the
United Nations could not operate on votes cast according to
population. The former colonies, due to their history of
separate charters from the Crown, and separate Governors and
legislative bodies, to say nothing of their equal votes under the
Articles of Confederation in the Continental Congress, thought
of themselves, when free, as independent nations. In no other
way would they have united to form a new nation. However,
in spirit we have long since passed from a union of nations to a
single nation, and this unjust relic from our historic past must
not continue forever.
Without waiting for the Constitution to be changed, the
Senators could remove this unfairness through establishing
the tradition that whenever a measure has been passed by a
majority of votes in the Senate cast by Senators representing a
minority of the people, a member of the majority will move
to make the vote unanimous against the measure in order to
conform to the will of the majority of the people. The procedure would be the same in reverse if a measure supported by
Senators representing the majority of the people lost.
Incidentally, to the shame of the Senate, its rules permit
filibusterers to set themselves up as minority rulers. If the
Senate is to continue this absurd practice, it should if necessary
stay in session twenty-four hours a day every day in the year
in order to at least make an effort to get its work done. Along
the same line, minority rule results when committees of a
legislative body are given excessive powers.
5. A Revolution Narrowly Averted.
As long as majority rule is not legally possible the danger
of revolution, peaceable or violent, will exist. If we believe in
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the right of the people to govern themselves we must believe
that the fundamental sovereignty of the people can not be
destroyed, so as to prevent them for a thousand years from
governing themselves by majority rule. If there is no legal
way for them to proceed, and the situation is serious enough,
they will have the same justification as Washington and Jefferson to take other steps. This is not being advocated, and it is
to be devoutly hoped that the necessity will never arise. If
the ideas set forth in this article are carried out it never will.
(Any minority rule is to that extent taxation without representation.)
It is interesting to note that the Articles of Confederation
preceding the Constitution provided that they could be
changed only by consent of all the members of the Confederation.34 This, however, did not prevent them from setting
up the Constitution, which went into effect without waiting
for all the former colonies to join.
Professor William Y. Elliott of Harvard said:
It does not require gifts of Pythian prophecy to foresee
what will happen if the constitutional system is not
reshaped to modern needs. If it remains unaltered legally
it will be pulled down piece-meal by force of circumstances.
An unworkable legislative system of checks and balances
will be superseded in times of crisis by executive authority
more and more Caesarian in character. 5
James MacGregor Burns wrote:
... Congress and the President [will go on living together].
But in the absence of party unity, wedlock would continue
to be unhappy and unfruitful. It would not yield the teamwork in government that we sorely need. Rather we could
expect recurrent periods of deadlock as Congress and the
President wrestled for supremacy, ending in shift to presidential rule as the people in time of crisis called for action6
any action. Could our democracy stand the strain? 3
34 MILLSPAUGH, TOWARD EFFICIENT DEMOCRACY 266 (1949).

35

THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 206 (1935).

86 CONGRESS ON TRIAL 211 (1949).
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Mr. Thomas K. Finletter gave this warning:
If there is to be a move from the representative system in
this country, it may be sudden or it may be gradual. If
we run into extremely difficult conditions in our domestic
economy and the people get the conviction that the quarreling between the Executive and Congress is incurable, they
may throw over the whole attempt at self-rule with one
stroke and authorize government by executive decree.
The gradual destruction of Congress is also possible.
It could take the form of an increased use of executive
orders instead of legislation in domestic affairs and of
executive agreements instead of treaties in foreign matters,
and of other devices to by-pass Congress. The condition
might become so bad that public opinion would sanction
the use of executive orders to the exclusion of congressional legislation. If that became the settled practice,
whether all at once or by gradual steps, it would mark the
death of representative government and the end of the
attempt of the American people to govern themselves
[beyond election of the President]. 37
An incident in the presidential career of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, largely unnoticed at the time and since, shows how
dose we have already come to a technical revolution. The
occurrence is thus described by James MacGregor Burns:
Mr. Roosevelt's most sensational assertion of presidential
power came nine months after Pearl Harbor. It had become
clear during 1942 that the Emergency Price Control Act,
passed by Congress early that year, could not hold the
price line ... In a Labor Day address on September 7 the
President demanded that Congress repeal this provision.
Mr. Roosevelt said bluntly: 'I ask the Congress to take
this action by the first of October . . . In the event that
Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall
accept the responsibility, and I will act.'38
Congress passed the necessary legislation before the time
limit set.
37 Can Representative Government Do the Job? 20 (1945).
3S

CONGRESS ON TRIAL 180 (1949).
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Roosevelt's contemplated action would have been a
technical revolution and a most distressing precedent. It is
true that there would have been no protest from the public,
but throughout the world democratic government has often
died with general approval, as seems to have been the case in
France in recent years (written in April, 1962). Much has been
written about steps taken by presidents in time of war in
excess of their legal authority, but none of those actions,
though showing the defects of checks and balances, involved a
deliberate formal assumption of authority contrary to the
constitutional system.
6. Thomas Wilson Dorr-A Revolution to Attain Majority
Rule Attempted.
A unique episode in American history, the Dorr War, or
Dorr Rebellion, as it is more commonly called, involved a
miniature civil war in Rhode Island, representing an effort to
free the state from an oligarchy entrenched behind an unamendable constitution. Thomas Wilson Dorr, who should be
immortal, sacrificed his health and his life to establish democratic government. Like Nathaniel Bacon he suffered because
he was a hundred years ahead of the times. The story is told in
a great historical work, Arthur May Mowry's "The Dorr
War". 3

9

Mowry commences his book:
A little more than fifty years ago [writing in 1900] the
State of Rhode Island passed through a struggle which
not only led to civil war within the State itself but also
aroused great interest in other parts of the country. The
contest was unique; in its causes it finds no parallel in the
annals of any state of the Union; history records few civil
wars in which the antagonism of parties was so intense,
few which collapsed so completely and so suddenly, and
yet few which accomplished a more definite result [the
termination of the oligarchy]. It would be worthy of
study, even were the causes less significant; but the causes
illustrate, as almost no other episode of this [nineteenth]
century, the development of democratic government.
39 Published

in 1901, by Preston & Rounds Co., Providence, R. I.
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The noted historian Albert Bushnell Hart, in his highly
commendatory Introduction to Mowry, says: "Perhaps the
main lesson of the whole controversy, and the lesson to which
Mr. Mowry especially addresses himself, is the power of strong,
moderately phrased, and continuous public protest, and its
superiority to forcible revolution." A purpose of this article
is by treating basic causes, to assist in preventing the development of any occasion for another such chapter in our history.
Rhode Island in 1840 was still operating under the original
Charter of the Colony granted by Charles II in 1663 (the other
twelve original states had adopted constitutions). The Charter
created the Colony as a corporation, the members, corresponding to stockholders, being the "freemen", which came to
mean the citizens, of the various towns. The Charter contained no provision for amendment (though there was an
unused provision that the General Assembly, the governing
body, could make "new forms of government").
The Charter contained two features which gradually
aroused intense hostile public opinion-restriction of the
right to vote to certain property owners, so that only a minority
could vote; and a fixed permanent apportionment of members
of the Assembly to the various towns in a way which was fair
under the original conditions, but which gradually became
very unfair as the cities developed (the same evil dealt with by
Baker v. Carr.)
Some leaders finally decided that something must be done.
The ruling oligarchy showed no disposition to yield its
privileged position, and under the Charter there was no legal
way to correct conditions (in the earlier stages of the controversy President Tyler, appealed to by both sides, declined
to exercise any initiative).
Under the leadership of Dorr, a Providence lawyer, the
State Suffrage Committee sent pamphlets to the people of the
towns, asking them to elect delegates to a convention, entirely apart from the government of the state, to frame a new
Constitution. Amid increasing tension the convention met
October 4th, 1841, and on November 18th voted to submit
the Constitution which it had adopted to the voters in un-
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official elections, to go into effect if approved by a majority
of all the voters of the state. It was claimed by the Dorr group
that the votes cast for the Constitution did represent a majority
of all the voters, and it seems probable that this was true,
although the claim was contested by the supporters of the old
state government. The new government commenced operation, and elected Dorr Governor. He was inaugurated May
3rd, 1842, and before the New General Assembly delivered one
of the great speeches of American history. 4o
The pre-existing General Assembly had also called a
"Freemen's" constitutional convention, and in 1842 it adopted
a Constitution which was more liberal than the Charter, but
which was rejected by the voters.
The state got to the verge of civil war. May 17th, 1842,
Dorr, with a force of some two hundred men, made a bloodless and unsuccessful effort to capture the state Arsenal at
Providence. Later he assembled a force of possibly five hundred armed men, who camped at Acote's Hill. The opposing
Governor called out the militia, and again appealed to President Tyler. Tyler made it known that he would support the
previously existing government. He did not pass upon the
merits of the dispute, but took the position that he would
support the established government until informed that
another had taken its place (this action is said to have injured
the Whig Party nationally).
This was the beginning of the end for Dorr. His followers
began to rapidly desert him, and he fled the state June 27th,
1842, calling upon his adherents to disperse (the casualties
were one killed and two wounded, all across the Massachusetts
line). Dorr was later tried for treason against the state, and
sentenced to life imprisonment. After having been held in
jail several months awaiting trial, he spent a year in the penitentiary before he was pardoned by the General Assembly.
Six years later, by which time he was a broken-hearted man,
he was restored to his civil rights.
40 A portion of itis to be found in MARK AND SCHWAB, THE FAITH OF
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After three more years the Assembly reversed the judgment
of the Rhode Island Supreme Court that Dorr had been guilty
of treason. Mowry states that now Dorr is "worn out in mind
and body, without spirit or energy, grown old before his
time". He died ten months later at the age of forty-nine, a
martyr to his devotion to the principles upon which this
country was founded. Doctor Hart says that "the Dorr
Rebellion is one of the most distinct and striking incidents of
the long American struggle for manhood suffrage".
In 1842, the year of Acote's Hill, the old General Assembly
adopted a better Constitution to replace the one it had previously submitted to the voters, and which had been rejected
by them. The new one was approved by the voters. While far
from perfect, on the whole the new Constitution represented
a victory for Dorr's ideas. It improved the apportionment
of members of the General Assembly. Most writers feel that
Dorr deserves the credit for this result. The Dorr struggle
attracted intense national attention, and caused a great deal
of discussion in Congress, but the debates went off on party
lines, and nothing came of them (except weakening of the
Whig Party).
On June 25th, 1842, the old, or Freemen's (anti-Dorr),
government declared martial law. It was in full force for
forty days, and was enforced with great harshness. Hundreds
were arrested and held in confinement, and hundreds of houses
were searched for hidden weapons or men. Sixteen persons
were confined for three days in a cell twelve feet by nine feet.
Out of the martial law period arose the most famous
"political questions" case in the history of the country prior to
Baker v. Carr: Luther v. Borden, decided in 1849.41 While
Luther, a moderator at a town meeting under the auspices
of the Dorr group, was away from home, nine men, headed by
Borden, broke into his home to arrest him. He sued for damages for this trespass, raising the question which of the two
governments was the lawful one. The United States Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Taney writing the opinion, held that it
could not go into this-that when Congress continued to
4148U. S. (7 How.)

1 (1849).
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admit the Senators and Representatives from the old (antiDorr) government, its authority and its republican character
were recognized "by the proper constitutional authority",
and that the decision of Congress "could not be questioned in
a judicial tribunal". In view of the physical condition which
had existed and the action of Congress, it seems that the
court acted properly in ruling that the question was "political"
and not "judicial-. The later error of the court has been in
applying the doctrine to cases which it could handle.
The verdict of history, influenced by Mowry, is that Dorr
was not justified in resorting to force, or in attempting even a
peaceful revolution. Nevertheless, Mowry concludes the
chapter on his personality and character:
Of whatever failings Thomas Wilson Dorr may be accused,
his virtues dearly outrank them. Whatever he did to lose
the esteem of his contemporaries is more than offset by
the truth of the cause in which he was engaged. His trial
and conviction were unnecessary, and his early death
might have been postponed. If we call him a rebel, we
must call him an honest rebel and one who sought only
what seemed to him the true welfare of the people. If we
condemn him for what he did, we must praise him for
what he meant to do. And, after all, Thomas Wilson Dorr,
though he never realized it, did bring a people's government to the people of Rhode Island.
It was more than a coincidence that in Rhode Island
Thomas Wilson Dorr found oligarchy and left democracy.

